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THE RIGHT AND REMEDIES OF THE
UNITED STATES UNDER THE FEDERAL
MEDICAL CARE RECOVERY ACT
A serviceman, accompanied by his wife, is driving along an
interstate highway on his way home. Suddenly, a car in the oppo-
site lane swerves to the left, crosses the medial strip, and crashes
headon with the serviceman's automobile. The serviceman and his
wife are both taken to the local hospital and receive treatment for
a period of thirty days. The hospital and doctor bills for both the
serviceman and his wife are then paid by the United States pur-
suant to the Dependent's Medical Care Act.' Prior to 1962 the
tortfeasor would now receive a windfall in the amount of the
hospital and doctor bills since neither the United States nor the
serviceman 2 could recover these expenses from him. In 1962 Con-
gress provided the means whereby the United States could now
assert its right to collect these expenses by enacting the Federal
Medical Care Recovery Act.8
This Comment will consider the nature of the right created in
the United States under the FMCRA and the means by which
the United States may enforce this right. Specifically, the Com-
ment will focus on whether the FMCRA creates an independent
right in the United States or a right based on equitable subroga-
tion principles. Once the nature of the right has been established,
the three recognized means of enforcing that right 4 will be ana-
l. 10 U.S.C. § 1071-87 (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1965-66).
2. The collateral source doctrine, followed by many states, is an
exception to this rule of damages. Stated generally, the doctrine holds
that the fact that a plaintiff receives payment from a collateral source
which may serve to mitigate the consequences of his injury which he
could otherwise recover from the defendant, may not be taken into con-
sideration in assessing the damages which the defendant must pay. Annot.,
75 A.L.R.2d 885 (1961). In Arvin v. Patterson, 427 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1968), the court extended the collateral source doctrine to a plaintiff
who was furnished medical care gratuitously by the United States.
Id. at 644.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2651-53 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as the FMCRA].
The legislative history of this Act will only be discussed where pertinent
to the specific area being covered. For an overall analysis of the legisla-
tive history of the FMCRA see Bernzweig, Public Law 87-693: An Analy-
sis and Interpretation of the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 1257 (1964).
4. Two of the three means of enforcement are found in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2651(b) (1964), namely intervention or joinder in the suit by the injured
party, or institution of an independent action by the United States. The
third means, subrogation, is found in 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1964). As
will be seen, the subrogation remedy does not enjoy the same recognition
as the other two.
lyzed to determine if these means limit the right or merely pro-
vide procedural guidelines for its enforcement.
Since the provisions of the FMCRA which establish its rights
and remedies are somewhat ambiguous, certain canons of statutory
construction have been used to interpret these provisions. The
canon most often sought to be applied to the FMCRA is the maxim
of strict construction against a right given the United States
which it did not have at common law. This narrow construction
has been rejected by at least two courts which were faced with
the argument.5 United States v. Wittrock6 held that a canon of
strict construction will not be used to defeat the clear intention
of Congress in passing the Act.7 United States v. York8 is in
accord, stating that a canon of strict construction is opposed by
another canon which holds that ambiguous language will justify
the courts in looking to the legislative history of a statute.9 York
then concludes that this conflict indicates that canons are only a
rough guide to aid the courts in reaching an interpretation that will
effectuate the purpose of the statute under consideration. 10 Since
the purpose of the statute is to effect a federal fiscal policy,1 it is
submitted that the FMCRA should be interpreted liberally in tune
with this fiscal objective. Such a liberal construction will enable
the United States to effect the legislative intention that it recoup
the costs incurred for hospital and medical care which previously
were characterized as a loss to the Government.
1 2
I. NATURE OF THE RIGHT
Current litigation has established quite clearly that the FMCRA
creates an independent right in the United States to recover for
5. United States v. York, 398 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1968); United States
v. Wittrock, 268 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
6. 268 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
7. Id. at 327.
8. 398 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1968).
9. Id. at 586 n.6.
10. Id.
11. In United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947) the court
rejected an attempt by the United States to recover its medical costs from
a third party tortfeasor. The court stated that:
the issue comes down in final consequence to a question of federal
fiscal policy, coupled with considerations concerning the need for
and the appropriateness of means to be used in executing the pol-
icy sought to be established.
Id. at 314. "Congress ... is the custodian of the national purse," the
court continued; ". . . it is the primary and most often the exclusive arbi-
ter of fiscal affairs." Id. Thus the court concluded that the right of the
United States to recoup its losses was dependent on statute. Congress re-
sponded by enacting the FMCRA in 1962. In S. REP. No. 1945, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1962), the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the figures
concerning potential recovery of costs incurred by the United States
demonstrate the relation of the Act to the fiscal policy of the United States.
12. S. REP. No. 1945, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1962).
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the reasonable value of hospital and medical care furnished to an
injured party. 13 The applicable section of the Act which creates
this right reads as follows:
In any case in which the United States is authorized or
required by law to furnish hospital, medical, surgical, or
dental care and treatment ... to a person who is in-
jured . . . under circumstances creating a tort liability
upon some third person . . . to pay damages therefore, the
United States shall have a right to recover from said
third person the reasonable value of the care and treat-
ment so furnished or to be furnished and shall, as to this
right be subrogated to any right or claim that the injured
or diseased person ... has against such third person to the
extent of the reasonable value of the care and treatment
so furnished or to be furnished.
14
The independent right created in the United States is bottomed
on the existence of a cause of action by the injured party against
the tortfeasor. The substantive aspects of this cause of action
rest on principles determined by local law.1
The legislative history which lead to the enactment of this
provision supports the view that the right created in the United
States is an independent one. The original statute adopted by the
House Judiciary Committee stated that the United States shall be
subrogated to any right or claim of the injured person.' A staff
memorandum from the Comptroller General's Office criticized the
proposed statute for failing to create an independent right in the
United States to recover these medical expenses. The memoran-
dum stated that the claim of the United States is not one for
subrogation but rather for an independent liability owing directly
to itself for losses caused in discharging its duty to care for the
13. United States v. Gera, 409 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1969); United
States v. York, 398 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Merrigan,
389 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1968); United States v. Fort Benning Rifle and
Pistol Club, 387 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1967); Maddux v. Cox, 382 F.2d 119
(8th Cir. 1967); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. United States, 376
F.2d 836 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Nation, 299 F. Supp. 266 (N.D.
Okla. 1969); United States v. Winter, 275 F. Supp. 895 (E.D. Pa. 1967);
United States v. Wittrock, 268 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1967); United States
v. Greene, 266 F. Supp. 976 (N.D. Ill. 1967); United States v. Jones, 264
F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Va. 1967); Phillips v. Trame, 252 F. Supp. 948 (E.D. Ill.
1966); Tolliver v. Shumate, 151 W. Va. 105, 150 S.E.2d 579 (1966). But cf.
United States v. Housing Authority of Bremerton, 276 F. Supp. 966 (W.D.
Wash. 1967); United States v. Bartholomew, 266 F. Supp. 213 (W.D. Okla.
1967) (dictum).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1964) (emphasis added).
15. See note 75 infra.
16. 108 Cong. Rec. 6669 (1961).
soldier.17 The Comptroller General seemed to be recommending
that the fiscal policy behind the Act dictated that it be amended
to give the United States an independent cause of action.
Pursuant to the Comptroller General's memorandum the House
Judiciary Committee amended the statute to its present form and
stated:
This amendment makes clear that the United States is
granted a distinct right to recover its costs and that this
right is to be effectuated through a partial subrogation to
any right which the injured or diseased person may have
to proceed against the negligent third party.'
It seems clear that the Legislature intended that the final version
of the FMCRA create an independent cause of action in the
United States to recover the medical care it has furnished to the
injured party.19
A further argument in favor of an independent right in the
United States stems from the basic distinction between an inde-
pendent cause of action and a cause of action founded upon the
equitable principles of subrogation.20 As mentioned earlier, the
original Act was critizied by the Comptroller General for not cre-
ating an independent cause of action. He argued that in those
states which hold that an injured party may not recover for
medical services provided without cost by the Government, 21 the
United States, as a subrogee, would also be barred from recovery.
If an injured party, subrogor, has no right to recover the medical
costs furnished by the United States, the United States, as subro-
gee, has no cause of action to be subrogated to and hence cannot
recover its expenses. The Comptroller General concluded that
such a construction would defeat the fiscal objectives of the Act.
22
The Comptroller General's argument has received support from
several cases. In United States v. Greene23 the tortfeasor sought
to bar the cause of action by the United States on the grounds
that, (1) the state statute of limitations had expired, and (2) the
injured party had given a general release to the tortfeasor.2 4 Both
of these defenses would bar the United States if its claim were
17. 2 U.S.C. Cong. and Admin. News 2646 (1962).
18. H. R. REP. No. 1534, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962).
19. United States v. York, 398 F.2d 582, 584 (6th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1968); United States v. Fort
Benning Rifle and Pistol Club, 387 F.2d 884, 886 (5th Cir. 1967).
20. It must be stressed that at this point in the Comment subrogation
is referred to as the basis of the right out of whch a cause of action arises.
See notes 64-84 infra and accompanying text for the discussion of subro-
gation as an additional equitable means of enforcing the Government's
independent cause of action.
21. Those states which do not permit such a recovery do not follow
the collateral source doctrine mentioned in note 2 supra.
22. 2 U.S.C. Cong. and Admin. News 2646 (1962).
23. 266 F. Supp. 976 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
24. Id. at 978.
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merely derived from the subrogor, injured party. If the United
States possessed an independent claim, however, the defenses
would be struck down. The court first analyzed the legal nature
of subrogation, stating that it is essentially a derivative right held
by one (United States) who, pursuant to a legal or equitable
obligation to another person (injured party), pays that person a
debt owed by a third party (tortfeasor). The right of the payor
(subrogee-United States) to seek reimbursement from the third
party debtor is derived from, and generally dependent upon, the
existence of a right in the payee (subrogor-injured party) against
the third party debtor. If the payee collects from the debtor, the
payor may get a refund from the payee. If the payee fails to de-
mand satisfaction from the debtor, the payor may assert the right
of the payee against the debtor. The payor's cause of action is
subject to all the procedural and contractual defenses which the
third party debtor has against the payee.
25
Greene then applied these concepts to the third party liability
created by the FMCRA. The injured person (payee) can only
recover expenses which he has become liable to pay as a result of
the tortious conduct of a third party. Since the injured person
(payee) is not liable for these expenses when he receives free
medical care, he cannot recover them from the third party debtor
(tortfeasor). Hence no underlying obligation exists between the
tort victim and the tortfeasor to which the United States could
be subrogated. In a true subrogation situation it is the payor's
(subrogee's) payment of this underlying obligation which subro-
gates the payor to the payee's rights.26 The Greene court thus
concluded that the cause of action of the United States is not
founded upon subrogation principles and held that the expiration
of the state statute of limitations and the general release given
by the injured party did not cut off the independent claim of the
United States.
27
United States v. Fort Benning Rifle and Pistol Club28 is in
accord with Greene. In Fort Benning the court decided the right
of the United tSates cannot be a subrogated right in the traditional
sense, since the only time the FMCRA authorizes recovery is when
the United States is required by law to give treatment and care.
In these situations the court reasoned the injured party, not having
himself furnished the medical care, has no right of recovery to
25. Id. at 979.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 980.
28. 387 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1967).
which the United States can be subrogated.2 9 The court concluded
that the United States stands in the role of a subrogee only to
the extent of determination of third-party liability under local law.
The independent right of the United States is subject only to sub-
stantive state laws which create or negate a cause of action for tor-
tious conduct.30 The state statute of limitations, which was the
problem raised in Fort Benning, has nothing to do with whether
the circumstances surrounding the injury create a tort liability
and cannot be used to defeat the independent claim of the United
States. 1
The legislative history of the FMCRA as well as the cases in-
terpreting its provisions clearly indicate that, under circumstances
creating a tort liability on a third person under local law, the
United States has an independent cause of action for medical care
furnished as a result of that tortious conduct. What practical bene-
fits exist in favor of the United States as an independent claimant?
A hypothetical case will illustrate how local law creates the
cause of action, and, once created, how the independent cause of
action works to the benefit of the United States. A asks B to
drive him to the hospital in A's automobile. A is the owner of the
vehicle and has insurance coverage which includes anyone who
drives A's vehicle with his consent. Since B is driving A's vehicle
with his consent, B becomes an insured under A's insurance cover-
age. On the way to the hospital B negligently strikes another
vehicle and injures A. A, a serviceman, receives medical care
from the United States pursuant to the Dependent's Medical Care
Act.3 2 The United States then claims this amount of care from A's
insurance carrier. The insurance carrier denies liability on two
grounds; first, A's insurance policy specifically precludes him
from claiming against the liability portion of his own insurance
coverage, and second, since B was driving the vehicle for the sole
purpose, use, and benefit of A, in the absence of any gross negli-
gence, B cannot be held liable. What now becomes of the Govern-
ment's independent claim?
The independent claim of the United States is conditioned on
circumstances creating a tort liability upon some third person. 33
This substantive determination of third party liability rests upon
local law.84 In our hypothetical case, there must be a cause of
29. Id. at 887.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 10 U.S.C. § 1071-87 (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1965-66).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1964) reads in part:
In any case in which the United States is required by law to fur-
nish hospital, medical, surgical, or dental care and treatment ...to a person who is injured or suffers a disease ... under circum-
stances creating a tort liability upon some third person ... to pay
damages therefore, the United States shall have a right to recover
from said third person the reasonable value of the care ....
34. See note 75 infra.
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action under local law by A (owner-injured person) against B
(driver-tortfeasor) for liability in tort. If B were merely A's agent,
as the insurance company claims, and local law stated that in the
absence of gross negligence an agent is not liable for torts commit-
ted upon his principal during the scope of his employment, then no
third party liability would exist. If B were grossly negligent,
however, A would have a cause of action against B under local
law, which cause of action would give rise to the independent right
of the United States to pursue its claim against B for medical
care furnished to A.
Assuming that A has a cause of action for tort liability against
B, what about the argument by the insurance company that A
cannot claim against the liability portion of his insurance cover-
age? The existence of third-party (B) liability gives rise to an
independent claim by the United States. As a result of B's grossly
negligent act, the United States was injured in the amount of the
medical care that it furnished to A. The United States, as an in-
jured, independent party, becomes a claimant for this amount
against the liability portion of the insurance coverage extended to
B. The United States is not claiming as a subrogee to the rights of
A under his own policy, but as an injured person under the lia-
bility portion of the insurance coverage extended to B as driver of
A's vehicle. Thus the United States, not A, is claiming against
the insurance company.
Another situation in which it becomes important for the
United States to be an independent claimant arises when the in-
surance company pays the policy limit to the injured party. Since
the United States claims as an injured, independent person under
the insurance policy, the insurance company is prevented from
denying liability to the United States on the ground that it has
expended its liability coverage to the injured party. For instance,
assume in the above hypothetical that B is the owner as well as
the driver of the vehicle and A is the injured serviceman. If the
liability portion of B's insurance coverage provides for $10,000 per
person and $20,000 per accident, the fact that the insurance com-
pany has paid $10,000 to A does not preclude the Government's
claim. The United States, as an injured, independent claimant,
becomes a "person" under the policy and is entitled up to $10,000
for the medical care it has furnished to A. 35
35. The insurance company may argue that for purposes of insur-
ance coverage the United States is subrogated to the body of the injured
party. However, in Government Employees Ins. Co. v. United States, 376
F.2d 836 (4th Cir. 1967), the court held that the United States qualifies as
Other benefits derived by the United States as an independent
claimant stem from the fact that the right of the United States is
subject to state substantive defenses only if these defenses indi-
cate that the injury did not arise under circumstances creating
tort liability upon a third person.38 In our hypothetical case,
the fact that the United States may have brought its action after
the state statute of limitations had expired does not constitute a
substantive defense to its cause of action.3 7 Limitation has nothing
to do with whether the circumstances surrounding the injury create
a tort liability and hence the local statute cannot be used to defeat
the claim.f8 Moreover, a three year federal statute of limitations 3
has been enacted and held applicable to claims asserted by the
United States under the FMCRA.
40
In addition, the insurance company may argue that A (injured
party) executed a general release as to all claims arising out of
the accident. Again, since the claim is independent, this contrac-
tual defense against the injured party is not available against
the United States.41 Only the United States is capable of releasing
its independent rights.
Finally, the United States, being an independent claimant, is
not required to give notice to the tortfeasor before instituting
suit against him,4 2 and the United States qualifies as an injured
a "person" under the uninsured motorist clause of the injured party's insur-
ance policy. See note 43 infra. The Government Employees case, as well
as the independent nature of the Government's right and the fiscal objec-
tives of the Act, indicate that the United States should also qualify as a"person" under the liability portion of the tortfeasor's insurance policy.
36. United States v. Fort Benning Rifle and Pistol Club, 387 F.2d
884, 886 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Greene, 266 F. Supp. 976, 980
(N.D. Ill. 1967); see also note 75 infra.
37. United States v. Gera, 409 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1969); United States
v. Fort Benning Rifle and Pistol Club, 387 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1967);
United States v. Greene, 266 F. Supp. 976 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
38. Cases cited note 37 supra.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b) (Supp. II, 1965-66).
40. United States v. Gera, 409 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1969).
41. United States v. Winter, 275 F. Supp. 895 (E.D. Pa. 1967); United
States v. Greene, 266 F. Supp. 976 (N.D. Ill. 1967). See also United States
v. Guinn, 259 F. Supp. 771 (D.N.J. 1966). In Guinn the court felt it was
necessary to establish constructive knowledge of the Government's claim
by the tortfeasor so that a general release by the injured party would not
bar the United States from asserting its claim. The court improperly classi-
fied the claim of the United States as one of subrogation. Since a general
release executed by a subrogor to the tortfeasor will bar the subrogee if
the tortfeasor has no knowledge of his interest, the court held that the tort-
feasor had constructive knowledge of the Government's rights. Id. at 773.
Thus, the general release by the injured party did not serve as a bar to the
United States. It is important to note that, since the claim of the United
States is independent, actual or constructive knowledge of the Govern-
ment's claim by the tortfeasor becomes irrelevant. The injured party
simply cannot release the independent claim of the United States for the
reasonable value of medical care furnished to him.
42. United States v. York, 398 F.2d 582, 584 (6th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Bartholomew, 266 F. Supp. 213, 215 (W.D. Okla. 1967). See also
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claimant under the uninsured motorist clause of the injured party's
insurance coverage. 43 Therefore, if both the injured party and the
United States may claim through an uninsured motorist clause in
the injured party's insurance policy, the fact that the insurance
company settles with the injured party (insured) without notice
of the Government's rights should not then serve as a bar to the
assertion of the Government's independent claim under the policy.
4
II. MEANS USED TO ENFORCE THE RIGHT
Having examined the fundamental nature of the cause of ac-
tion which the FMCRA creates in the United States, it now be-
comes necessary to analyze the means with which this right may
be enforced. Generally, there are three recognized means of en-
forcement:
As the court reads 42 USC 2651, the United States Govern-
ment has three ways of recovering for medical and hos-
pital care furnished to a plaintiff claiming tort liability
by a third person: (1) by subrogation; (2) by intervening
or joining in any action brought by the injured person;
and, (3) by instituting such an action itself or in con-
junction with the injured or diseased person.
45
The conflict centers on whether the three remedies are mandatory
or permissive in nature. If construed as mandatory, they will
severely limit the independent nature of the claim. If construed as
permissive, however, the remedies merely provide procedural
guidelines for the liberal enforcement of an independent right.
United States v. Guinn, 259 F. Supp. 771 (D.N.J. 1966). In Guinn the
court inferred that no notice is required by holding that the tortfeasor has
constructive knowledge of the Government's claim. Id. at 773. Taken to-
gether, these three cases seem to indicate that when the insurance company
representing the tortfeasor expends the total amount of the coverage au-
thorized for the accident by the policy, without considering the claim of
the United States, it does so at its peril and will not be relieved of liability
to the United States.
43. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. United States, 376 F.2d 836
(4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Commercial Union Ins. Group, 294 F. Supp.
768 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
44. For example, suppose the policy coverage provides for up to
$5,000 for each person entitled to claim under the uninsured motorist
clause. The insurance company settles with its insured (injured party),
paying him $5,000, without notice of any claim by the United States. The
United States, as an independent, injured claimant under the policy, is still
entitled up to $5,000 for medical care it has been required to pay as a re-
sult of the accident with the uninsured motorist. See note 42 supra for
the result when the insurance company has expended the total amount of
uninsured motorist coverage authorized for the accident without consider-
ing the claim of the United States.
45. Conley v. Maattala, 303 F. Supp. 484, 485 (D.N.H. 1969).
A. Intervention, Joinder or Independent Action 46
The FMCRA has created enforcement procedures which deal
with intervention, joinder, and independent action:
The United States may, to enforce such right, (1) inter-
vene or join in any action or proceeding brought by the
injured or diseased person ... against the third person
who is liable for the injury or disease; or (2) if such action
or proceeding is not commenced within 6 months after the
first day in which care and treatment is furnished by the
United States in connection with the injury or disease in-
volved, institute and prosecute legal proceedings against
the third person who is liable for the injury or disease,
in a state or federal court, either alone . . . or in con-
junction with the injured or diseased person. .... 17
The problem centers on whether the United States, by failing to
intervene under clause (1) when the injured party brings suit
within 6 months of the date of initial treatment, is thereafter
barred from instituting an independent action after the 6 month
period under clause (2).
A few jurisdictions have given the statute such a strict con-
struction and barred the independent suit by the United States.
In United States v. Housing Authority of Bremerton,48 the in-
jured party brought suit against the defendant within five months
of the date of injury. The United States did not intervene but
filed an independent suit against the defendant after the six
month waiting period. The defendant contended that if the United
States wishes to assert a claim, it must intervene if a suit is
brought by the injured party within six months. The court up-
held this contention, stating that the language of the statute is
mandatory, requiring the United States to intervene in any suit
brought by the injured party.4 The statute prevents multiple
litigation against the tortfeasor by authorizing independent action
solely upon the failure of the injured party to bring his own cause
of action within the six month period.50 United States v. Bar-
tholomew 1 arrived at the same result, holding in dictum that the
United States must intervene in any suit brought by the injured
party within six months of his initial treatment, to enforce its
claim.5
2
The great majority of the courts have refused to apply such
a strict construction to the FMCRA, however, and have found
46. The subrogation remedy will be discussed separately since, un-
like intervention, joinder, or an independent action, it is not clearly estab-
lished by statute.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (1964).
48. 276 F. Supp. 966 (W.D. Wash. 1967).
49. Id. at 969.
50. Id.
51. 266 F. Supp. 213 (W.D. Okla. 1967) (dictum).
52. Id. at 214.
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the language of the statute to be permissive rather than manda-
tory.53 These courts advance several reasons in support of their
position. First, the plain meaning of the statute seems to dictate
the permissive interpretation, since if Congress had intended to
make compliance with the enforcement section mandatory, the
section would have begun, the United States shall, to enforce this
right, as opposed to the actual statute which reads, "The United
States may, to enforce this right .... -54 Second, as mentioned
earlier, 55 a canon of strict construction should not be used to de-
feat the intent and purpose of the statute. A liberal interpretation
of the remedial provisions of the Act will enable the United States
to recoup its losses in third-party liability cases, and hence achieve
the fiscal objectives intended by the Act.5 6 Finally, the legislative
history behind the remedial provisions gives no indication that
Congress, by providing certain procedures for enforcement, in-
tended to exclude all other methods of enforcement that would
normally be available to the United States.5 7 The remedial pro-
visions, established by statute were necessary to carry out specific
desires of Congress, namely to give the United States an absolute
right to intervene, not subject to the discretion of the court, and to
delay the exercise of independent action by the United States for
six months to enable the injured person to bring his own action.58
Nothing in the legislative history evinces a concern for the possi-
bility that the tortfeasor will be subjected to multiple litigation.59
Also, the legislative history does not seem to indicate that Congress
intended to impose a partial statute of limitations on the inde-
pendent right by requiring the United States to intervene when
an injured party files suit within six months of his initial treat-
ment, or be barred from recovery.
60
These arguments provide a sound basis for holding that the
53. United States v. York, 398 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1968); United States
v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1968); United States v. Nation, 299 F.
Supp. 266 (N.D. Okla. 1969); United States v. Wittrock, 268 F. Supp. 325
(E.D. Pa. 1967); United States v. Jones, 264 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Va. 1967).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (1964) (emphasis added). United States
v. Wittrock, 268 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1967) holds that, "if Congress had
wished to make compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 2651(b) mandatory, it would
have used a word such as 'shall' in place of 'may" in that subsection."
Id. at 327 n.7.
55. See notes 5-12 supra and accompanying text.
56. S. REP. No. 1945, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1962).
57. United States v. York, 398 F.2d at 585-86 (6th Cir. 1968).
58. Id. at 586.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 586-87; acsoTd, United States v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d at 25
(6th Cir. 1968).
remedial provisions of section 2651 (b) are permissive in nature and
intended merely as procedural guidelines for the enforcement of
the Government's right. Clause (1) of section 2651(b) states that
when the injured party does sue, the United States may intervene
at any time in that suit.61 In the event the United States does
not intervene, clause (2) of section 2651(b) does not now serve
as a bar to the later exercise of the Government's right, but
merely provides that it must wait six months to allow the injured
party to assert its cause of action before this right may be exer-
cised.2 Thus, under section 2651(b), the United States may, (1)
intervene in any suit brought by the injured party, (2) join with
the injured party in any action he may file, or (3) file an inde-
pendent action after six months from the first day in which the
United States furnished care to the injured party.
B. Subrogation
This section will discuss the effect of the following language
found in the FMCRA:
. . . [The United States] shall, as to this right be subro-
gated to any right or claim that the injured or diseased
person . . . has against such third persons to the extent
of the reasonable value of the care and treatment so fur-
nished or to be furnished.6 3
The question centers on whether the United States may enforce its
independent right through an equitable remedy of subrogation.
This question is distinguished from the earlier discussion of
whether the Government's cause of action is an independent one
or one founded solely on equitable principles of subrogation.
6 4 If
the cause of action were based solely on subrogation, the only
available means of enforcing that right would be an equitable
remedy of subrogation. Since the cause of action is an independent
one, however, the question arises whether the United States can,
among other means of enforcement, pursue its claim through a
subrogation remedy.
Several courts have interpreted the above language as allow-
ing the United States to resort to a subrogation remedy as an addi-
tional means of enforcing its independent right. 5  A few courts
have denied the United States this subrogee status, however, hold-
ing that the language in the statute places the United States in the
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (1964).
62. See note 60 supra.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1964).
64. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
65. United States v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1968) (dictum);
Maddux v. Cox, 382 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1967) (dictum); Conley v. Maattala,
303 F. Supp. 484 (D.N.H. 1969); United States v. Gera, 279 F. Supp.
731 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, United States v. Gera,
409 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1969); United States v. Winter, 275 F. Supp. 895
(E.D. Pa. 1967) (dictum).
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role of a subrogee only to the extent of determination of third-party
liability under state law.60 While this question of statutory inter-
pretation is important, it should be noted that the existence of a
subrogation remedy is not dependent upon statute but rather upon
equity.6 7 Thus, it is first necessary to discuss the nature and
purpose of an equitable remedy of subrogation, and whether the
United States may enforce its rights as a subrogee without benefit
of statute. Then, the subrogation language of the statute will be
analyzed to determine if Congress believed that third-party liability
under the FMCRA presented a fact situation within the equitable
principles of a subrogation remedy.
Couch in his treatise on Insurance states that the doctrine of
subrogation has its origin in general principles of equity and does
not arise from statute, custom, or any terms of a contract.0 8 Sub-
rogation rests on principles of natural justice and is applied accord-
ing to the dictates of equity and good conscience, and to the con-
siderations of public policy that no one should be enriched by
another's loss.69 Couch states the purpose of this equitable remedy
as follows:
A sounder approach to the problem is that a wrongdoer
who is legally responsible for the harm should not re-
ceive the windfall of being absolved from liability because
the insured had had the foresight to obtain, and had paid
the expense of procuring, insurance for his protection;
since the insured has already been paid for his harm,
the liability of the third person should now inure for
the benefit of the insurer. Stated simply, subrogation is a
creature of equity having for its purpose the working out
of an equitable adjustment between the parties by securing
the ultimate discharge of a debt by the person who in
equity and good conscience ought to pay it.
70
The tortfeasor in a third-party liability situation should not re-
ceive a windfall because the injured party has his medical bills
paid by the United States. Indeed, Congress enacted the FMCRA
to prevent such a windfall and enable the United States to recoup
its losses.71 It is submitted that the United States may now, to
enforce its right, rely on this "creature of equity" to work out an
equitable adjustment with the third party tortfeasor. Such an
66. United States v. Fort Benning Rifle and Pistol Club, 387 F.2d 884
(5th Cir. 1967) (dictum); Carrington v. Vanlinder, 58 Misc. 2d 80, 294
N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
67. 16 G. CoucH, INSURANcE § 61:20, at 250 (2d ed. 1966).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 16 G. COUCH, INSURANCE § 61:18, at 248 (2d ed. 1966).
71. See S. Rzp. No. 1945, 87th Cong., 2d Seas. 4 (1962).
adjustment will secure "the ultimate discharge of a debt by the
person who in equity and good conscience ought to pay it."
By referring to subrogation in the statute,7 2 did Congress
believe that equitable principles should allow the United States
to work out such an "equitable adjustment" with the tortfeasor
as one means of enforcing its independent right? In United States
v. Fort Benning Rifle and Pistol Club,78 the court held that the
plain meaning of the statute did not dictate this result. The lan-
guage of the statute, instead of complementing the right created in
the United States with an additional right of subrogation, refers
directly to and modifies the primary right initially created by the
statute.7 4 Thus the United States is subrogated only to the extent
of determination of third-party liability under state law.75 The
court also held that since the United States cannot have a subroga-
tion right in the traditional sense, it also cannot have a subroga-
tion remedy to enforce its independent right.
76
United States v. Gera7 interprets the statute differently. The
applicable provision of the statute reads, "and shall, as to this right
be subrogated." Gera holds that the word "and" must be given
full effect as saying "furthermore" rather than "that is to say."78
Hence the language following "and" merely provides that
with respect to that portion of damage which the injured
party might otherwise recover which compromises or
duplicates that which the statute authorizes the Govern-
ment to collect, the Government shall succeed to the rights
of the injured party. ... 79
United States v. Merrigan0 looks to the legislative history of the
72. See note 63 supra.
73. 387 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1967) (dictum).
74. Id. at 887.
75. Id. Other courts [see, e.g., United States v. Greene, 266 F. Supp.
976 (N.D. Ill. 1967)], have relied on the mere fact that the statute does
not require the application of federal substantive law in order to hold
that local law applies. Bernzweig in his article on the FMCRA gives simi-
lar reasons for applying local law. He states first that the silence of the
Act indicates that Congress intended local law to apply, for when Congress
desires to depart from local law it usually makes that intention clear in
the statute itself. Second, when Congress remains silent on the issue of
governing tort law, the courts have consistently applied local law tort rules.
And finally, the purpose of the Act, namely to recoup costs and not to regu-
late conduct of tortfeasors, indicates that local law should apply. Bernz-
weig, Public Law 87-693: An Analysis and Interpretation of the Federal
Medical Care Recovery Act, 64 COLUM. L. Rr. at 1262 (1964). It seems
that the above reasoning presents a sounder basis for applying local law
than the reliance on the subrogation language of the statute by the Fort
Benning court.
76. United States v. Fort Benning Rifle and Pistol Club, 387 F.2d at
887 (5th Cir. 1967) (dictum).
77. 279 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds,
United States v. Gera, 409 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1969).
78. Id. at 732.
79. Id.
80. 389 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1968) (dictum).
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Act to reach the same result as Gera. By amending the statute to
give the United States an independent right, Congress made subro-
gation "one of the remedial consequences of the Government's
right, a subsidiary equitable remedy, which did not limit the pri-
mary right."8' Congress could not have intended to limit the right
for a grant of an equitable remedy of subrogation is not from its
nature a limitation on a right of action.
82
It is submitted that the result reached in Gera and Merrigan
is in accord with both the plain meaning and legislative intention
of the statutory provisions dealing with subrogation. Subrogation
should be construed not as a limit upon the primary right but as
an aid to that right.8 3 Also, the mere fact that the Government's
right is not founded upon a subrogation should not preclude its
enforcement through equitable subrogation principles.8 4 It has
been held that "it was clearly the intention of Congress . . .. to
enable the government freely to assert this cause of action in any
of a wide variety of possible procedural alternatives."8 5 In con-
sidering the Act's fiscal objectives, along with Couch's purpose for
the remedy, it seems that subrogation should be one of these pro-
cedural alternatives for enforcement. If so, two courses of action
may now be available to the United States to enforce its right.
81. Id. at 24. The court states that this amendment process indicates
why the provision for subrogation appears in part (a) of the statute rather
than in the remedial provisions in part (b). The amendment giving the
United States an independent right was accomplished by adding immedi-
ately before the provision on subrogation a new provision that the United
States "shall have a right to recover from said third person the reasonable
value of the care and treatment so furnished." Id. The court concludes
that by placing this new provision before the subrogation language, and
not in place of it, "subrogation was made one of the remedial consequences
of the Government's right." Id. The Judiciary Committee, in describing
the purpose of the new provision, seems to agree with Merrigan:
This amendment makes clear that the United States is granted a
distinct right to recover its costs and that this right is to be effectu-
ated through a partial subrogation to any right which the injured
or diseased person may have to proceed against the negligent third
party.
H. REP. No. 1534, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962).
82. United States v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d at 24 (3d Cir. 1968) (dictum).
83. For an additional argument against the limited construction of
subrogation in Fort Benning, see note 75 supra.
84. United States v. Winter, 275 F. Supp. 895 (E.D. Pa. 1967), held
that the subrogation language of the statute is not rendered meaningless
by giving the United States an independent right. In some procedural con-
texts, a subrogee status may be significant. Id. at 896.
85. United States v. Winter, 275 F. Supp. at 896 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
1. Enforcement through the Injured Party
First, where the injured party has a cause of action for dam-
ages he suffered, he may bring an action in his own name, without
the joinder of the United States, for his damages as well as the
damages due the United States.8 6 To arrive at this result it is
necessary to place the United States in the same position as a
subrogated insurer and the injured party in the same position as an
insured. If the insured has suffered a partial loss, a majority of
the jurisdictions, under real party in interest statutes,87 treat both
the insured and the insurer as "real parties in interest" and allow
the insured to sue for the full amount of the loss.88 The defendant,
however, may compel or waive joinder of the insurer in those
jurisdictions where the insurer is deemed a necessary party. 9
Finally, in jurisdictions which have no real party in interest stat-
utes, the insured is the owner of the claim and an action to en-
force the subrogation rights of the insurer must be brought in the
name of the insured.
9 0
The above general rules are subject to important exceptions
in two jurisdictions. Pennsylvania's statute requiring the real
party in interest to bring suit 91 was amended in 1941 to provide
that the "rule shall not be mandatory where a subrogee is a real
party in interest. '9 2 By virtue of this amendment, Watson v. Hol-
lacher Delivery Service, Inc.,98 held that an insurer which has paid
part of an insured's loss and has been subrogated need not be
joined as a party plaintiff with the insured in an action for the
entire loss against the tortfeasor 4  In New York, a statute on
joinder of parties states that,
[e] xcept where otherwise prescribed by order of the court,
an .. .insured person who has executed to his insurer
either a loan or subrogation receipt, trust agreement, or
other similar agreement ...may sue or be sued without
joining with him the person for or against whose interest
the action is brought.95
86. Conley v. Maattala, 303 F. Supp. 484 (D.N.H. 1969). Contra,
Carrington v. Vanlinder, 58 Misc. 2d 80, 294 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
87. The normal wording of such a statute is as follows: ". . . [A]ll
actions shall be prosecuted by and in the name of the real party in inter-
est .. " PA. R. Cmv. P. 2002 (a).
88. Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d at 149 (1967). The federal courts are substan-
tially in agreement with the majority of jurisdictions which allow the
injured party to sue for the whole loss. Id. at 147. The federal courts are
in conflict, however, as to whether the defendant can compel joinder of
the insurer under FE. R. Civ. P. 19. For a discussion of this conflict see
Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d at 156 (1967).
89. Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d at 149 (1967). See note 88 supra for the right
to compel the joinder of the insurer in the federal courts.
90. 16 G. COUCH, INSURANCE § 61:27, at 255 (2d ed. 1966).
91. PA. R. Civ. P. 2002 (a).
92. Id. 2002(d).
93. 43 Pa. D. & C. 120 (M.C. Phila. 1942).
94. Id. at 121; accord, 44 Pa. D. & C. 701 (C.P. Mif. 1942).
95. N.Y.R. Civ. PRAc. 1004.
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Skinner v. Klein" interprets this statute as stating that where an
insurer pays to the insured only a portion of the latter's claim
for a loss occasioned by the wrongdoing of another, the insured
remains the real party in interest entitled to prosecute in his name
an action for the entire loss against the wrongdoer. 7
In two cases the United States sought to have its claim en-
forced through a suit by the injured party for the whole loss.
Carrington v. Vanlinder9 8 relied on United States v. Fort Benning
Rifle and Pistol Club,9 9 holding that the FMCRA in no way pro-
vides that the United States can be subrogated as an insurance
carrier might be. Therefore, the court refused to consider the
New York statute which does not require joinder of the insurer 00
and held that the United States cannot recover unless it is made a
party to the action by intervention or joinder.10 1 Conley v. Maat-
talal 0 2 reached a different result. The court recognized subroga-
tion as one means of recovering the medical care furnished to the
injured party. Therefore it saw no valid reason why the United
States should be required to be made a party to the injured party's
suit either by intervention or joinder. 03 Such a requirement might
indeed prove prejudicial to the plaintiff:
It is important . . . that the plaintiff be accorded a fair
trial and that the attention of the jury not be distracted
from the main issues of liability and damages by the fact
that the United States is a party because it furnished
hospital and medical services free of charge to the plain-
tiff.10 4
It is submitted that the result reached in Conley serves to
carry out the fiscal objectives of the FMCRA. If the jurisdiction
in which the injured party brings suit permits an action for the
whole loss by an insured, and if the injured party is willing to
assert a cause of action for the entire loss, 05 he should be per-
96. 24 App. Div. 2d 433, 260 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1965).
97. Id. at 434, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
98. 58 Misc. 2d 80, 294 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
99. 387 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1967).
100. N.Y.R. Civ. PRAc. 1004.
101. Carrington v. Vanlinder, 58 Misc. 2d 80, 294 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup.
Ct. 1968).
102. 303 F. Supp. 484 (D.N.H. 1969).
103. Id. at 485.
104. Id.
105. United States v. Jones, 264 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Va. 1967) has inter-
preted 42 U.S.C. § 2652(c) (1964) as indicating that an injured service-
man should not be required to institute an action which would include a
claim for the medical care furnished by the United States. The agencies
which collect funds under the FMCRA have acted in accordance with this
mitted to include the claim of the United States with his own. As
a -precautionary- measure, the injured party should show to the
court written consent by the United States that he may assert the
Government's claim. Also, the complaint should read that the
plaintiff seeks to recover the reasonable value of medical care
furnished to him by the United States, for the sole use and benefit
of the United States in accordance with the FMCRA. If the above
precautions are taken, the determination by the court litigating
the claim of the injured party will be binding on both the in-
jured party and the United States. This course of action will pre-
vent double recovery against the tortfeasor, eliminate multiple
litigation against the tortfeasor, and remove any prejudice to the
injured party's cause of action.
2. Suit Against the Injured Party
The second course of action available to the United States as
a subrogee involves a right to sue the injured party for the medical
care furnished by the United States which the injured party has
recovered from the tortfeasor. Again, this right of action stems
from treating the United States as a subrogated insurer and the
injured party as an insured. It is generally accepted that a subro-
gated insurer has a right of action against its insured to recover
the payments made-under the policy where the insured has settled
with or released the wrongdoer allegedly responsible for the loss.10 6
Three distinct theories have been recognized which support this
right of action. 10 7 First, the action of the insured in settling
with or releasing the wrongdoer is a breach of the subrogation
agreement between the insurer and the insured. 08 Second, since
no one ought to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another,
there is an implied promise on the part of the insured to reimburse
the insurer after he has settled with the tortfeasor. 10 9  Third,
equitable considerations dictate that the insured reimburse the
insurer in the amount over and above the insured's loss; therefore
the insured recovers this amount in trust for the insurer. 110 Fi-
interpretation by offering the attorney for the injured party the oppor-
tunity to represent the interests of the United States. Should the attorney
choose not to do so, the United States will then pursue collection of its
claim independently.
106. 44 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 1841 (1969).
107. See Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 697 (1957) for a complete discussion of
these three theories.
108. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Grimes, 278 Minn. 45, 153 N.W.2d
152 (1967); Grisham v. Moore, 241 Miss. 802, 133 So. 2d 403 (1961); All-
state Ins. Co. v. Dye, 113 Ohio App. 90, 170 N.E.2d 862 (1960).
109. Egan v. British Ins. Co., 193 Ill. 295, 61 N.E. 1081 (1901); Farm
Buteau:Mut. Ins.: Co. v-. Anderson, 360 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962);
United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v. Hills, 172 Neb. 128, 109 N.W.2d 174 (1961).
110. Federal Ins. Co. v. Engelhorn, 141 N.J. Eq. 349, 57 A.2d 478 (1948);
'Fort Worth & D. Ry. v. Ferguson, 261 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); 16
G Coucn, IwsrmANc. § 61:27, at 256 (2d ed. 1966).
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nally, it should be noted that. this right of recovery against the
insured is subject to two conditions. First,. the recovery by the
insured must bar the insurer from asserting any action against
the. tortfeasor. 111 Second, the insured must have recovered an
amount over and above his actual loss, thus limiting the insurer's
recovery from its insured to the amount over that loss. 112
Only one case; United States v. Ammons,"' has dealt squarely
with. the right of the United States to sue the injured party. In
Ammons, the court rejected any right of recovery by the United
States against the injured party on two grounds. First, the ex-
press terms of the FMCRA in no way authorized such a suit, and
second, the legislative history of the Act indicated that Congress
had ..no desire .to specify priorities for distributing the proceeds
recovered by the injured party.1 4 A later, case, United States v.
Greene,"15 interpreted Ammons to hold that the FMCRA does not
authorize the subrogee, United States, to get a refund from the
subrogor, injured party, where the latter has collected from the
wrongdoer. 16
In the Ammons case, the United States was still able to re-
cover its loss from the tortfeasor after it had been barred from
recovery against the injured party."7  Since one of the two re-
quirements necessary to permit suit by the insurer against its in-
sured was lacking," 8 the decision seems justified. If the United
States could no longer recover against the wrongdoer," 9 however,
it'seems that the same equitable theories which allow the insurer
to recover its loss' from its insured should apply here. And, accord-
ing to United States v. Gera,2 0 Congress intended this result, for
the subrogation language of the statute provides that,
with respect to that portion of damage which the injured
party might otherwise recover which compromises or
"ill. "not., 5i A.L.R.2d at 716.(1957).
.112. 'Id. at 719.
113. 242 F. -Supp. 461 (N.D. Fla. 1965).
114. Id. at 464.
15. 266 F Supp. 976 (N.D. Il1. 1967).
'116. Id. at 979.
117 United States V. Ammons, 242 F. Supp. at 464 (N.D. Fla. 1965).
118. That requirement, as mentioned in note 111 supra, is that the
United States (insurer) must be barred from asserting any action against
the wrongdoer.
119. A good illustration of this situation is when the injured party
brings an action for the entire loss, with the consent of the United States.
Such an action should be binding on the United States, thus precluding it
from later asserting an independent action against the tortfeasor.
120. 279 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds,
United States v. Gera, 409 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1969)..
duplicates that which the statute authorizes the Govern-
ment to collect, the Government shall succeed to the rights
of the injured party and shall be the beneficiary of such
recovery to the exclusion of the injured party.
121
CONCLUSION
Interpreted in tune with the fiscal objectives of the Act, the
FMCRA creates an independent cause of action in the United
States to recover for medical care furnished to an injured party.
This cause of action is dependent on circumstances which, under
local law, create a tort liability upon some third person. Once
created, the United States has several procedural alternatives with
which to enforce its right. First, it may intervene or join in any
action brought by the injured party. Second, it may assert an
independent action any time after six months from the first day in
which the United States furnished care to the injured party.
And third, the United States may rely on an equitable remedy of
subrogation, enforcing its right either through a suit by the in-
jured party, or, if necessary, by a cause of action against the in-
jured party.
JOHN E. EBERHARDT, JR.
EPILOGUE
Subsequent to the completion of this comment the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed the decision of the District Court in United States v.
Housing Authority of Bremerton, referred to on p. 124, supra. The
reversal, cited in 415 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1969), now establishes
quite clearly that the remedies afforded the United States in 42
U.S.C. 2651b (1964) are permissive in nature and not mandatory.
The Ninth Circuit in Bremerton also held in a case of first
impression that the negligence of the parents of the injured party
cannot be imputed to the United States so as to bar its recovery,
since under local law such negligence would not bar the child's
right to recover from the tortfeasor. 415 F.2d at 242 (9th Cir. 1969).
For a discussion of the applicability of local law to the cause of
action created in the United States, see note 33 supra and accom-
panying text.
121. Id. at 732 (emphasis added).
